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Abstract	  	  
The	  poor	  performance	  of	  biodiversity	   institutions	  has	  prompted	   calls	   for	   reform.	  Adaptive	  
governance	  has	  been	  promoted	  as	  a	  means	  of	  supporting	  improved	  biodiversity	  outcomes.	  
However,	   incorporating	   adaptive	   elements	   into	   biodiversity	   governance	   has	   been	   a	  
challenge.	  In	  particular,	  efforts	  to	  make	  institutions	  more	  ‘adaptive’	  often	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  
existing	  capacity	  and	  context-­‐specific	  factors.	  Clear	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  move	  from	  general,	  
ambitious	   adaptive	   governance	   prescriptions	   to	   specific,	   context-­‐dependent	  
recommendations	   is	   needed.	   This	   paper	   demonstrates	   how	   insights	   from	  pragmatism	   can	  
inform	  an	  approach	  for	  designing	  institutional	  reforms	  that	  address	  current	  shortcomings	  in	  
adaptive	   governance	   approaches.	   This	   design	   scaffolds	   reform	   options	   on	   a	   platform	   of	  
existing	  competency	  and	  institutional	  legacy.	  Informed	  by	  the	  results	  of	  a	  prior	  institutional	  
diagnosis,	   reform	   development	   followed	   a	   three-­‐stage	   process:	   defining	   plausible	   reform	  
spaces;	  identifying	  reform	  possibilities	  within	  these	  spaces;	  and	  elaborating	  reform	  options.	  
Two	   very	   different	   landscapes	   provided	   the	   case	   studies:	   a	   highly	   modified	   agricultural	  
landscape,	  where	  private	   landholders	  are	  responsible	  for	  managing	  biodiversity	  as	  a	  public	  
good;	   and	   a	   group	   of	   national	   parks,	   where	   the	   state	   holds	   primary	   responsibility.	   The	  
reforms	   in	   the	   agricultural	   landscape	   build	   on	   successful	   landholder	   and	   organizational	  
efforts	  to	  self-­‐organize	  and	  pursue	  innovative	  solutions,	  while	  those	  for	  the	  protected	  area	  
enable	  greater	  managerial	  discretion	  and	  address	  the	  challenges	  of	  working	  across	  multiple	  
government	  jurisdictions.	  This	  context-­‐driven	  approach	  draws	  on	  insights	  from	  pragmatism	  
to	   provide	   guidance	   on	   the	   design	   of	   institutional	   reforms	   that	   meet	   the	   demands	   of	  
adaptive	  governance	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  both	  systematic	  and	  realistic.	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1	  Introduction	  
Governance	  reform	  is	  needed	  to	  more	  effectively	  address	  the	  causes	  of	  biodiversity	  
decline.	   Although	   biodiversity	   conservation	   has	   been	   codified	   in	   formal	   institutional	  
frameworks	   for	   several	   decades,	   the	   rapid	   rate	   of	   biodiversity	   loss	   continues	   and	   is	   even	  
increasing	  (Butchart	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Failure	  to	  avert	  biodiversity	   losses	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  
an	   overemphasis	   on	   threatened	   species	   and	   ecological	   communities	   in	   biodiversity	  
institutions,	   without	   adequate	   consideration	   of	   landscape-­‐scale	   ecological	   processes	  
(Bennett	  et	  al.	   2009;	  Benson	  2012).	   Shifting	   to	  a	   landscape-­‐scale	  approach	   is	  not	   the	  only	  
change	  needed.	  Increasing	  pressures,	  such	  as	  climate	  change,	  mean	  adaptation	  needs	  to	  be	  
embedded	   in	   biodiversity	   institutions	   (Burch	   et	   al.	   2014).	   The	   interactions	   between	   socio-­‐
economic	  and	  environmental	  systems	  also	  require	  formal	  and	  informal	   institutions	  capable	  
of	   anticipating	   and	   responding	   to	   complex	   and	   often	   uncertain	   dynamics	   and	   solutions	  
appropriate	   for	   the	   local	   context.	   Such	   challenges	   are	   not	   effectively	   addressed	   by	  
traditional	  efficiency-­‐driven,	  centralized	  environmental	  governance	  systems	  (Brunner	  2010;	  
Hill	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Chaffin	  et	  al.	  2014).	  	  
Adaptive	  governance	  (AG)	  has	  been	  promoted	  as	  a	  desired	  objective	  for	  institutional	  
reform,	  under	   the	  premise	   that	   it	  offers	  principles	   for	  decision-­‐making	  better	  equipped	   to	  
cope	  with	   the	   inherent	   uncertainty	   and	   complexity	   of	   social-­‐ecological	   systems	   through	   a	  
more	  experimental,	  learning-­‐driven	  approach	  (Brunner	  2010;	  Chaffin	  et	  al.	  2014).	  It	  also	  calls	  
for	   multi-­‐layered	   governance	   networks	   that	   foster	   learning,	   build	   social	   capital,	   and	   link	  
across	   vertical	   and	   horizontal	   scales	   (Armitage	   et	   al.	   2012;	   Lebel	   et	   al.	   2006;	   Folke	   et	   al.	  
2005;	  Dietz	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Buffering	   is	  an	   important	   feature	  of	  AG,	  referring	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  
respond	  adequately	   to	  ecological	   threats,	  mitigate	  external	  pressures	   (e.g.	  market	   forces),	  
and	  cope	  with	  uncertainty	  (Boyd	  and	  Folke	  2011).	  	  
Despite	   enthusiasm	   for	   AG	   in	   the	   environmental	   governance	   literature,	  
implementation	   of	   adaptive	   systems	   in	   practice	   remains	   slow,	   in	   part	   because	   its	  
prescriptions	   often	   fail	   to	   account	   for	   the	   institutional	   impediments	   experienced	   by	  
governance	   actors	   (Rijke	  et	   al.	   2012;	  Ojha	  et	   al.	   2013).	   AG	   has	   also	   been	   criticized	   for	   its	  
normative	  focus	  on	  adaptability	  and	  transformability	  as	  necessary	  characteristics	  to	  achieve	  
desired	  ecosystem	  states	   (Nelson	  et	  al.	  2007).	  Although	  AG	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	   set	  of	  value-­‐
neutral	   features	  of	  governance	  where	  actors	  decide	  what	   the	  desired	  end	  goal	   is,	   this	  has	  
often	  not	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  AG	  literature	  (Chaffin	  et	  al.	  2014).	  	  
AG	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  systems	  thinking/resilience	  literature,	  where	  institutions	  are	  
seen	   as	   critical	   influences	   on	   the	   capacity	   of	   actors	   to	   adapt	   to	   ecological	   change.	   At	   the	  
same	  time,	  this	  literature	  offers	  little	  guidance	  as	  to	  how	  intentional	  design	  can	  foster	  more	  
‘adaptive’	  institutions,	  especially	  since	  they	  are	  mainly	  viewed	  statically,	  as	  impediments	  to	  
change	   (Matthews	  and	  Sydneysmith	  2010).	  AG’s	   resilience	   roots	  have	  also	   led	   to	  a	   strong	  
focus	   on	   scientific	   understanding	   of	   the	   system.	   Conversely,	   it	   has	   also	   meant	   under-­‐
engagement	  with	  how	  the	  institutional	  context	  and	  socio-­‐political	  factors	  influence	  decision-­‐
making,	   problem-­‐solving,	   and	   other	   elements	   of	   capacity	   and	   adaptive	   capacity	   (Voß	   and	  
Bornemann	  2011;	  Matthews	  and	  Sydneysmith	  2010;	  Wyborn	  2015).	  While	  AG	  can	  occur	  in	  
spite	  of	  the	  constraining	  forces	  of	  institutions	  and	  productively	  build	  on	  institutional	  legacy	  
(Schoon	  2013),	   there	   is	   little	  guidance	  on	  how	   institutional	  designers	  can	  build	  on	  present	  
coping	  capacities	  as	  well	  as	  enhance	  institutional	  capacity	  to	  anticipate	  and	  adapt	  to	  future	  
environmental	  changes	  (Berman	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
The	  aim	  of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  potential	   of	   a	  pragmatist	   approach	   to	  
designing	  adaptive	  biodiversity	  conservation	  institutions,	  and	  specifically	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  
addressing	   weaknesses	   in	   current	   adaptive	   governance	   approaches.	   A	   pragmatist	  
perspective,	   along	   with	   congruent	   concepts	   from	   the	   institutional	   change	   literature,	  
provides	   new	   guidance	   on	   how	   institutional	   design	   can	   be	   oriented	   toward	   large-­‐scale	  
institutional	  change.	  A	  pragmatist	  approach	  ensures	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  institutional	  legacy	  
as	  a	  platform	  for	  reforms,	  thereby	  providing	  continuity	  between	  past	  and	  future.	  Specifically,	  
the	   concept	   of	   scaffolding	   provides	   guidance	   on	   how	   to	   use	   existing	   capacity	   and	  
institutional	   structures	   as	   platforms,	   while	   adding	   new	   institutional	   elements	   addressing	  
context-­‐specific	  needs	  in	  designing	  reform	  options.	  Our	  approach	  considers	  how	  reforms	  can	  
build	   adaptive	   capacity,	   or	   the	   ability	   of	   institutions	   to	  withstand	   and	   respond	   to	   change	  
(Armitage	   and	   Plummer	   2010).	   It	   also	   attends	   to	  more	   general	   capacity,	   or	   the	   ability	   to	  
identify	  and	  solve	  problems	  and	  deploy	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  (Virji	  et	  al.	  2012),	  and	  refers	  to	  
them	  both	  under	  the	  umbrella	  concept	  of	  competence	  (Ansell	  2011).	  
Our	   demonstration	   focuses	   on	   two	   case	   studies:	   a	   highly	   modified	   agricultural	  
landscape,	  where	  private	   landholders	  are	  responsible	  for	  managing	  biodiversity	  as	  a	  public	  
good;	  and	  a	  largely	  natural	  protected	  area	  where	  the	  state	  holds	  primary	  responsibility.	  The	  
next	   section	   introduces	   concepts	   from	   AG	   and	   pragmatism,	   as	   well	   as	   congruent	   insights	  
from	  the	  institutional	  change	  literature	  that	  informed	  development	  of	  the	  staged	  approach	  
to	  designing	  reforms	  (Section	  3)	  and	  the	  reform	  options	  (Sections	  4	  and	  5).	  
2	  Institutions,	  institutional	  change	  and	  pragmatism	  
Competence	   to	   conserve	   biodiversity	   under	   times	   of	   rapid	   environmental	   change	  
requires	   flexibility	   and	   reflexivity.	   Institutions	   can	   provide	   the	   basis	   for	   this	   capacity,	   but	  
such	   dynamics	   are	   antithetical	   to	   those	   normally	   attributed	   to	   institutions	   (Goodin	   1996).	  
Institutions	   are	   comprised	   of	   regulative,	   normative,	   and	   cultural-­‐cognitive	   elements.	   They	  
structure,	  stabilize,	  and	  provide	  meaning	  to	  social	  life,	  and	  shape	  the	  structure	  and	  identities	  
of	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  (Scott	  2014).	  	  While	  institutions	  are	  capable	  of	  both	  abrupt	  
and	  gradual	  change,	  they	  also	  have	  strong	  status	  quo	  biases	  and	  path	  dependencies,	  making	  
radical	  change	  a	  rarity	  and	  a	  challenge	  for	  planned	  design	  (Scott	  2014;	  Young	  2008).	  Yet	  as	  a	  
direct	  challenge	  to	  traditional	  modes	  of	  governance,	  AG	  is	  often	  said	  to	  require	  more	  radical,	  
transformative	  change	  (e.g.	  Olsson	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Westley	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Chaffin	  et	  al.	  2014),	  but	  
such	  change	  is	  difficult	  to	  design.	  
Institutional	  reform	  efforts	  must	  be	  informed	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  institutions	  and	  
how	  they	  change.	  Many	  models	  that	  seek	  to	  provide	  understanding	  exist.	  Such	  models	  tend	  
to	  incorporate	  the	  degree	  of	  change	  (incremental	  or	  radical)	  and	  its	  pattern	  (continuous	  or	  
discontinuous).	   Punctuated	   equilibrium	   (Baumgartner	   et	   al.	   2014)	   and	   critical	   juncture	  
(Thelen	  1999)	  models	  help	  explain	  how	  abrupt,	   radical	   change	   (e.g.	  new	  policy	  directions,	  
changes	   in	   fundamental	   assumptions	   about	   the	  problem)	   can	   follow	  prolonged	  periods	  of	  
relative	  stability,	  but	  are	   less	  useful	   for	  understanding	   incremental	  change	  and	  how	  actors	  
decide	   which	   changes	   to	  make	   (Campbell	   2010).	   Incrementalist	   literatures	   (e.g.	   Lindblom	  
1990;	   North	   1990)	   have	   practical	   appeal	   because	   the	   case	   evidence	   demonstrates	   that	  
consensus	   on	   small	   adjustments	   can	   be	   readily	   achieved.	   However,	   incremental	   reforms	  
tend	  to	  reinforce	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  largely	  maintain	  current	  policy	  directions	  (Ansell	  2011).	  
Maintaining	   current	   policy	   directions	   could	   have	   dire	   consequences,	   given	   the	   effects	   of	  
biodiversity	   loss	   are	   so	   significant	   on	   ecosystem	   functioning	   and	   human	  prosperity	   that	   it	  
now	  ranks	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  global	  drivers	  of	  environmental	  change	  (Cardinale	  
et	  al.	  2012).	  
Pragmatist	   perspectives,	   and	   similar	   theories	   within	   the	   institutional	   change	  
literature,	   suggest	   there	   is	   a	   path	   between	   the	   slow	   grind	   of	   incrementalism	   and	   abrupt	  
transformations	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  engineer.	  Pragmatist	  philosophy	  combines	  incremental,	  
systematic,	   and	   reflective	   elements	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   change.	   Accepting	   that	   large-­‐scale	  
change	  is	  not	  designed,	  change	  instead	  scaffolds	  on	  institutional	  competency,	  is	  mindful	  of	  
institutional	   legacy,	   and	   explicitly	   aims	   toward	   a	   larger-­‐scale	   goal	   (Ansell	   2011).	   Design	  
efforts	   do	   not	   take	   place	   in	   institutional	   ‘greenfields’,	   highlighting	   an	   imperative	   to	   be	  
mindful	   of	   institutional	   legacy	   in	   designing	   reforms	   (Ansell	   2011;	   Schoon	   2013).	   Although	  
this	   legacy	  may	  hinder	  achievement	  of	   an	   ideal	  model	  of	   governance,	   it	   also	  provides	   the	  
institutional	  memory	  and	  baseline	  capacity	  for	  reformed	  arrangements.	  
This	   idea	   of	   cultivating	   existing	   competencies	   while	   also	   reorienting	   governance	  
toward	  a	  new	  direction	  has	  similarities	  to	  bricolage	  and	  translation	  theories	  of	  institutional	  
change.	  Bricolage	  explains	  how	  institutional	  changes	  occur	  through	  processes	  that	  combine	  
and	   recombine	   existing	   institutional	   elements	   (Campbell	   2004),	   and	   suggests	   that	  
institutional	   arrangements	   are	   always	   a	   combination	   of	   new	   and	   old	   (Cleaver	   2012).	  New	  
elements	  can	  be	  added	  in	  a	  process	  of	  diffusion	  and	  then	  translation,	  where	  new	  concepts	  
are	  introduced	  by	  institutional	  entrepreneurs	  and	  modified	  to	  fit	  local	  institutions,	  and	  thus	  
contribute	   to	  more	   radical	   change	   (Campbell	   2004,	  2010).	   Similarly,	   pragmatism	  describes	  
how	  new	  elements	  are	  integrated	  or	  used	  to	  reconstruct	  habit	  (Ansell	  2011).	  	  	  
Pragmatism	   suggests	   existing	   elements	   combined	   with	   new	   institutional	   elements	  
can	   be	   used	   to	   guide	   reforms,	   through	   scaffolding	   and	   the	   pursuit	   of	   larger-­‐scale	  
institutional	  goals	  (in	  this	  case	  AG).	  These	  dynamics	  build	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  bricolage	  
and	  translation,	  as	  they	  use	  existing	  elements	  and	  introduce	  new	  ones	  that	  can	  be	  adapted	  
by	  actors	  in	  the	  local	  context.	  It	  also	  offers	  a	  way	  to	  modify	  AG	  prescriptions.	  For	  example,	  
pragmatist	   insights	   in	   public	   administration	   have	   informed	   governance	  models	   that	   share	  
some	  elements	  with	  AG	  but	  consider	  more	  carefully	   the	  administrative	   limits	  of	  managing	  
public	  problems,	  like	  democratic	  experimentalism	  (Sabel	  and	  Zeitlin	  2010)	  and	  collaborative	  
governance	  (Ansell	  and	  Gash	  2008).	  Pragmatist	  thinkers	  recognize	  too	  much	  flexibility	  can	  be	  
problematic,	  as	  can	  overly	  rigid	  rules.	  Thus,	  this	  literature	  also	  explores	  how	  competence	  to	  
reflect,	   learn,	  solve	  problems,	  collaborate,	  and	  act	  responsibly	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  can	  be	  
cultivated	  (Selznick	  2002).	  Building	  on	  these	  pragmatist	  and	  institutional	  theories	  of	  change,	  
this	  research	  outlines	  a	  staged	  approach	  to	  designing	  institutional	  reforms	  that	  scaffolds	  on	  
existing	  competencies	  while	  using	  AG	  as	  an	  aspirational	  endpoint.	  	  
3	  Developing	  the	  reforms	  
The	  overarching	  research	  design	  for	  this	  study	  was	  a	  case	  study	  methodology,	  with	  a	  
three-­‐stage	  approach	   in	  which	  multiple	  methods	  were	  used	   for	  data	  collection	   (Yin	  2009).	  
The	   Tasmanian	  Midlands	   and	  Australian	  Alps	  were	   selected	   as	   contrasting	   case	   studies	   to	  
reflect	  the	  globally	  diverse	  challenge	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation.	  Given	  the	  former	  is	  largely	  
state-­‐owned	  and	  managed	  protected	  area	  and	  the	  latter	  privately	  owned	  agricultural	   land,	  
they	   face	   different	   governance	   dilemmas	   and	   require	   different	   designs.	   Reform	  
development	   was	   in	   three	   stages:	   1)	   identifying	   the	   reform	   space	   and	   requirements	  
bounding	  the	  extent	  of	  reform	  possibilities;	  2)	  developing	  a	  reform	  map	  depicting	  the	  range	  
of	  possibilities	  within	  this	  space;	  and	  3)	  selecting	  and	  developing	  two	  reform	  options	  for	  each	  
case	  study	  from	  the	  range	  of	  possibilities	  (Figure	  1).	  The	  data	  collection	  methods	  deployed	  in	  
each	  stage	  are	  indicated	  in	  Table	  1.	  
	  
Figure	  1	  Three	  stages	  of	  reform	  development	  
The	  sources	  indicated	  in	  Table	  1	  were	  used	  in	  an	  iterative	  way	  and	  in	  several	  stages,	  
thereby	  developing	  the	  reform	  options	  using	  multiple	  sources	  of	  evidence.	  Knowledge	  of	  the	  
case	  study	  regions	  obtained	  from	  published	  material	  and	  the	  authors’	  previous	  work	  in	  these	  
regions	   were	   the	   main	   sources	   of	   information	   for	   stage	   1,	   and	   made	   a	   more	   limited	  
contribution	   to	   stages	   2	   and	   3	   (Table	   1,	   column	   2).	   Good-­‐practice	   case	   studies,	   largely	  
informing	  stage	  2	  (Table	  1,	  column	  3),	  were	  identified	  primarily	  through	  keyword	  literature	  
searches.	   AG	   and	   pragmatist	   insights	   on	   institutional	   theory	   and	   public	   administration	  
informed	  the	  reform	  mapping	  (stage	  2)	  and	  were	  particularly	  influential	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  reform	  options	  (stage	  3)	  (Table	  1,	  column	  4).	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Results	  from	  the	  development	  and	  application	  of	  a	  diagnostic	  framework	  (Clement	  et	  
al.	   2015,	   under	   review)	   (Table	   1,	   column	   5),	   were	   used	   to	   inform	   all	   three	   stages.	   An	  
institutional	  diagnostic	  assesses	  the	  salient	  elements	  of	  the	  policy	  problem	  of	  interest,	  from	  
a	  social	  and	  ecological	  perspective,	  to	  identify	  shortcomings	  and	  recommend	  potential	  areas	  
of	   reform.	   Using	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘fit’,	   the	   diagnosis,	   as	   applied	   in	   this	   study,	   identified	  
whether	  institutions	  associated	  with	  biodiviersity	  conservtion	  in	  the	  two	  study	  regions	  were	  
able	   to	   address	   the	   temporal,	   spatial,	   and	   functional	   aspects	   of	   the	   ecosystems	   being	  
managed,	  as	  well	  as	  cultural-­‐cognitive	  dimensions	  of	  institutions	  (e.g.	  framing,	  culture).	  	  
The	   diagnostic	   framework	   employed	   in	   this	   study	   drew	   on	   AG,	   pragmatism	   and	  
related	   institutional	   theory.	   The	   four	   areas	   of	   focus	   for	   diagnosis	   were	   the	   problem	   and	  
players,	   politics,	   competence	   and	   capacity	   (Figure	   2)	   (Clement	   et	   al.	   2015,	   under	   review).	  
The	   framework	   provided	   a	   structure	   for	   collecting	   and	   interpreting	   data	   from	   interviews	  
with	   key	   stakeholders	   associated	  with	  biodiversity	   conservation	   in	   each	   study	   region	   –	   49	  
respondents	   from	   the	   Midlands	   and	   51	   from	   the	   Australian	   Alps	   (Tables	   2	   and	   3).	   This	  
diagnosis	   was	   particularly	   valuable	   in	   determining	   possible	   reform	   options	   and	   the	  
institutional	   elements	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   scaffold	   reform	   (Table	   1,	   Stage	   3).	   The	   focus	  
groups	  method	  (Table	  1,	  column	  6)	  is	  discussed	  below	  as	  part	  of	  Stage	  3.	  	  
Stage	  1	  (reform	  space)	  drew	  on	  the	  regional	  and	  national	  context	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  
to	   define	   a	   reform	   space.	   This	  was	   the	   space	  within	  which	   plausible	   reforms	   could	   occur,	  
recognizing	  that,	  while	  some	  elements	  are	  amenable	  to	  re-­‐design,	  the	  choice	  of	  institutional	  
arrangements	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  social,	  ecological	  and	  institutional	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  
embedded	  (Hollingsworth	  2000;	  Cleaver	  2012).	  	  
	  
Figure	  2	  Diagnostic	  framework	  (Clement	  et	  al.	  2015,	  under	  review)	  
	  
Table	  2	  Interview	  and	  focus	  group	  participant	  affiliations	  (Tasmanian	  Midlands)	  
	   Interviews	   Focus	  Groups	  










Government	  officials	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐ Federal	   11	   1	   0	   8	  
-­‐ State	  (Tasmania)	   9	   0	   6	   0	  
-­‐ Regional	  NRM	  groups	   3	   1	   1	   0	  
-­‐ Local	   3	   0	   0	   0	  
Non-­‐government	  officials	  and	  
representatives	  
-­‐ Agriculture-­‐related	  	   2	   1	   0	   0	  
-­‐ Conservation-­‐related	   7	   2	   1	   0	  
Other	   	   	   	   	  
-­‐ Local	  farmers/grazers	   6	   3	   0	   0	  










-­‐ Consultant	   1	   0	   0	   0	  
TOTAL	   49	   8	   9	   8	  
	  
	  
Table	  3	  Interview	  and	  focus	  group	  participant	  affiliations	  (Australian	  Alps)	  
	   Interviews	   Focus	  Groups	  







Government	  officials	   	   	   	  
-­‐ Federal1	   7	   0	   0	  
-­‐ State	  &	  Territory	  (NSW,	  VIC	  &	  
ACT)	   27	  
5	   5	  
-­‐ Regional	  (NRM)	   2	   0	   1	  
-­‐ Local	   2	   0	   0	  
Non-­‐government	  officials	  and	  representatives	  
-­‐ Tourism-­‐related	  	   2	   1	   0	  
-­‐ Conservation-­‐related	   2	   0	   0	  
Other	   	   	   	  
-­‐ Researchers	  &	  consultants2	  	   9	   1	   2	  
TOTAL	   51	   7	   8	  
1	  Five	  of	  these	  people	  also	  discussed	  the	  Midlands	  in	  their	  interviews.	  Between	  the	  two	  
case	  studies,	  13	  federal	  government	  officials	  were	  interviewed.	  
2	  Two	  researchers	  also	  discussed	  issues	  relevant	  to	  the	  Midlands.	  	  
	  
Stage	   2	   (reform	  mapping)	   was	   informed	   by	   good-­‐practice	   case	   studies,	   to	   suggest	  
what	  was	  possible,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  advise	  how	  the	  issues	  identified	  through	  the	  diagnosis	  could	  
be	  addressed.	  An	  understanding	  of	  context	  also	  influenced	  the	  reform	  mapping,	  and	  theory	  
was	   used	   to	   stretch	   thinking	   about	   plausible	   future	   possibilities.	   The	   reform	   maps	   were	  
meant	   as	   a	   heuristic	   device	   to	   spark	   discussion	   and	   debate	   about	   options.	   From	   these	  
possibilities,	   two	  options	  were	  selected	   for	   further	  elaboration,	  based	  on	   those	   that	  could	  
best	  address	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  diagnostic	  framework	  and	  associated	  interviews	  and	  for	  
which	  there	  were	  strong	  examples	  in	  the	  case	  literature.	  	  
Stage	   3	   (possible	   reform	   options)	   centered	   on	   drafting	   and	   refining	   governance	  
reforms;	  two	  for	  each	  case	  study	  region.	  Once	  designed	  and	  drafted	  using	  information	  from	  
the	   first	   two	  stages,	   feedback	  on	   the	   reforms	  was	  obtained	  via	   five	   focus	  groups	   (Table	  1,	  
column	  6).	  The	  three	  Midlands	   focus	  groups	  comprised:	   (i)	  agricultural	   interests	  and	  those	  
working	   directly	   with	   landholders;	   (ii)	   Tasmanian	   Government	   actors;	   and	   (iii)	   federal	  
government	   actors	   (Table	   2).	   The	   Alps	   focus	   groups	   mainly	   comprised	   participants	   from	  
state	   government	   agencies	   with	   responsibility	   for	   land	  management	   (Table	   3).	   The	   focus	  
groups	   addressed	   the	   following	   questions:	   did	   the	   options	   adequately	   address	   key	   issues	  
identified	  in	  the	  diagnosis;	  were	  the	  options	  realistic;	  and	  were	  there	  other	  ways	  governance	  
could	   be	   improved?	   The	   sampling	   logic	   for	   focus	   groups	  was	  purposive	   (Minichiello	   1995;	  
Creswell	   2013)	   with	   participants	   for	   each	   focus	   group	   selected	   to	   ensure	   enough	  
homogeneity	   to	   limit	   conflict,	  while	   ensuring	   sufficient	  diversity	   across	   all	   focus	   groups	   to	  
canvas	  a	  range	  of	  views	  from	  key	  actors	  (Stewart	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  
Stage	  3	  concluded	  with	  revision	  of	  the	  reform	  options	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  
address	   feedback	   from	   each	   focus	   group.	   Recognizing	   there	   are	   multiple	   pathways	   to	  
achieving	  reform,	  feedback	  was	  accommodated	  where	  possible,	  but	  moderated	  so	  that	  the	  
revised	   options	   still	   addressed	   identified	   weaknesses,	   accounted	   for	   the	   public	   good	  
characteristics	   of	   biodiversity,	   and	   were	   informed	   by	   the	   principles	   of	   good	   governance	  
(Lockwood	  2010).	  	  
4	  	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  reforms:	  Landholder	  duty	  of	  care	  for	  biodiversity	  in	  a	  
multifunctional	  landscape	  
4.1	  Reform	  space	  
The	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  (Figure	  3)	  has	  a	  reform	  space	  defined	  by	  the	  features	  of	  the	  
region	  relevant	  to	  biodiversity	  governance,	  Australia’s	  system	  of	  cooperative	  federalism,	  and	  
the	  public	  good	  characteristics	  of	  biodiversity	  (Table	  4).	  Biodiversity	  features	  are	  held	  almost	  
exclusively	   on	   private	   property	   in	   this	   agricultural	   landscape,	   which	   is	   designated	   as	   a	  
national	   biodiversity	   hotspot	   under	   threat	   (Department	   of	   the	   Environment	   2009).	   Native	  
grasslands,	   including	   the	   federally	   listed,	   critically	   endangered	   Lowland	  Native	  Grasslands,	  
are	  among	  the	  key	  biodiversity	  features	  in	  this	  region.	  	  
In	   the	  past,	   reliance	  on	  native	  grasslands	   for	  wool	  production	  has	  helped	  conserve	  
these	   ecosystems,	   but	   increasing	   agricultural	   intensification	   and	   irrigation	   now	   threaten	  
their	  survival.	  Dramatic	  declines	  in	  commodity	  prices	  have	  already	  driven	  diversification	  into	  
more	   intensive	   agriculture,	   with	   government	   investment	   in	   the	   Midlands	   Water	   Scheme	  
(MWS)	  expected	  to	  further	  this	  trend.	  In	  a	  region	  where	  native	  vegetation	  is	  less	  than	  30	  per	  
cent	  of	   its	  original	   extent,	   fragmented,	   and	  often	   in	  poor	   condition	   (Sattler	   and	  Creighton	  
2002),	   the	   development	   of	   the	   MWS	   is	   potentially	   significant	   at	   a	   landscape	   scale.	   The	  
impacts	   of	   the	  MWS	   are	   likely	   to	   include	   both	   listed	   species	   and	   native	   vegetation	  more	  
generally,	   through	   conversion	   of	   grassland	   ecosystems	   into	   irrigated	   cropping,	   dairy	   and	  
horticultural	  enterprises	  (Mitchell	  et	  al.	  2014).	  
	  Figure	  3	  Location	  of	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  region	  
Non-­‐regulatory	   instruments	   are	   increasingly	   favored	   as	   mechanisms	   to	   influence	  
private	   landholder	  behavior	   in	   the	  Midlands,	  mirroring	  worldwide	   trends	   (Doremus	  2003).	  
The	   Protected	   Areas	   on	   Private	   Land	   Program	   is	   a	   long-­‐standing	   example,	   in	   which	   the	  
Tasmanian	  Department	  of	  Primary	  Industries,	  Parks	  Water	  and	  Environment	  (DPIPWE)	  offers	  
incentives	   for	   voluntary	   adoption	   of	   covenants	   and	   management	   agreements	   (DPIPWE	  
2013).	   Conventional	   approaches	   have	   been	   complemented	   in	   recent	   years	   by	   more	  
innovative	   solutions.	   For	  example,	   the	  Midlandscapes	  program	   focuses	   strategically	   across	  
the	  whole	  bioregion.	  It	  operates	  under	  a	  ‘Conservation	  Action	  Plan’	  shared	  by	  the	  Tasmanian	  
Land	   Conservancy,	   Bush	   Heritage	   Australia,	   and	   Greening	   Australia,	   all	   non-­‐government	  
organizations	   (NGOs).	   The	   initiative	   includes	   the	  Midlands	  Conservation	   Fund,	   a	  perpetual	  
fund	  providing	  stewardship	  payments	  to	  farmers	  who	  enter	  an	  outcome-­‐based	  agreement.	  	  
Self-­‐organizing	  networks	  are	  an	   important	   institutional	   feature	   in	  the	  Midlands.	  For	  
example,	   a	   group	   of	   three	   landholders	   established	   the	   Tasmanian	   Rangelands	   Group,	  
inspired	  by	   the	  Malpai	  Borderlands	  Group	  of	   ranchers	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  which	  aims	   to	  
create	  a	  ‘radical	  center’	  that	  discards	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  conservation	  and	  production,	  
and	  seeks	  to	  make	  them	  symbiotic	  (Sayre	  2005).	  The	  Tasmanian	  network	  is	  negotiating	  with	  
government	   agencies,	   environmental	   NGOs	   and	   philanthropists	   to	   make	   biodiversity	  
conservation	   a	   financially	   viable	  proposition	  on	  working	   farms,	   but	  has	   yet	   to	   successfully	  
institutionalize	   their	   efforts.	   The	   Midlands	   Coordination	   Group	   is	   another	   developing	  
network	   of	   environmental	   NGOs	   and	   government	   representatives,	   seeking	   to	   better	  
organize	  and	  target	  the	  diverse	  range	  of	  conservation	  initiatives	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	  Midlands	   context,	   the	   nature	   of	   Australian	   governance	   and	   the	  
place	  of	  biodiversity	  in	  these	  systems	  influenced	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  reform	  space	  (Table	  
4).	   Under	   Australia’s	   Constitution,	   state	   governments	   are	   responsible	   for	   land	   and	  
biodiversity	   management,	   as	   moderated	   by	   heads	   of	   power	   that	   allow	   the	   federal	  
government	   to	   assume	   responsibility,	   for	   example,	   for	   meeting	   international	   obligations	  
under	   the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	   (CBD).	   These	   arrangements	   have	   constrained	  
the	   devolution	   of	   responsibility	   to	   landholders	   for	   setting	   biodiversity	   conservation	  
objectives,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   maintaining	   expectations	   that	   landholders,	   with	  
government	  support,	  will	  deliver	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
Table	  4	  Institutional	  elements	  bounding	  reform	  options	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  Midlands	  
Institutional	  element	   Implications	  for	  governance	  options	  
Under	  the	  Australian	  Constitution,	  states	  
have	  responsibility	  for	  land	  management	  
and	  its	  biodiversity;	  history	  suggests	  
constitutional	  change	  in	  Australia	  is	  difficult	  
(Bates	  2010).	  
Changing	  allocation	  of	  governance	  and	  
planning	  responsibilities	  would	  require	  a	  
formal	  agreement	  between	  the	  Tasmanian	  
and	  federal	  governments.	  
Federal	  regulatory	  powers	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  
Constitution.	  Federal	  listing	  of	  threatened	  
species	  and	  ecological	  communities	  under	  the	  
Environment	  Protection	  and	  Biodiversity	  
Conservation	  Act	  1999	  (Cth)	  (EPBC	  Act),	  
providing	  strategic	  guidance,	  and	  financial	  
incentives	  are	  important	  roles.	  
Biodiversity	  is	  a	  public	  good	  but	  is	  tied	  to	  
land	  tenure,	  with	  the	  Midlands	  
predominantly	  under	  private	  ownership.	  	  
Reform	  options	  are	  constrained	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  land	  tenure	  will	  remain	  private	  (i.e.	  
biodiversity	  values	  will	  not	  be	  decoupled	  from	  
the	  private	  land	  on	  which	  they	  sit).	  
Australia	  has	  a	  predominantly	  neoliberal	  
political	  philosophy	  and	  direct	  regulation	  is	  
generally	  viewed	  as	  an	  infringement	  on	  
private	  property	  rights	  (Lockie	  and	  Higgins	  
2007).	  Duty	  of	  care	  for	  biodiversity	  tends	  to	  
be	  adopted	  through	  market-­‐based	  rather	  
than	  statutory	  mechanisms	  (Earl	  et	  al.	  
2010).	  	  
Further	  limitations	  on	  private	  property	  rights	  
are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  supported	  in	  the	  short	  to	  
medium	  term,	  and	  most	  land	  use	  decisions	  
will	  remain	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  landholders.	  
Reform	  measures	  such	  as	  duty	  of	  care	  
legislation	  would	  be	  difficult	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
property	  rights	  reform	  (Brennan	  2004).	  	  
Agriculture	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  social	  
and	  economic	  fabric	  of	  the	  Midlands.	  
Any	  large-­‐scale	  land	  use	  changes	  will	  have	  
significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  
social	  and	  economic	  viability	  of	  the	  region.	  
Options	  integrating	  multiple	  values	  will	  have	  
better	  chances	  of	  success.	  
4.2	  Reform	  mapping	  
Having	   established	   a	   potential	   reform	   space,	   good-­‐practice	   case	   studies	   from	   the	  
literature	   and	   results	   from	   the	   diagnostic	   and	   associated	   interviews	   were	   used	   to	   map	  
governance	  options	   to	   guide	   development	   and	   selection	   of	   potential	   reforms.	   The	   reform	  
space	  for	  the	  Midlands	  can	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  triangle,	  with	  the	  suite	  of	  options	  considered	  
in	   terms	   of	   whether	   they	   favor	   government-­‐,	   community-­‐	   or	   market-­‐oriented	   solutions.	  
Current	  arrangements,	  with	  strong	  involvement	  by	  the	  Tasmanian	  and	  federal	  governments	  
in	   biodiversity	   conservation	   in	   the	   Midlands,	   sit	   slightly	   closer	   to	   government-­‐oriented	  
solutions	  than	  market-­‐	  or	  community-­‐oriented	  ones	  (Figure	  4).	  	  
	  Figure	  4	  Map	  of	  governance	  possibilities	  for	  the	  Midlands1	  
	  
Analysis	   of	   European	   case	   studies	   suggested	   establishing	   the	   Midlands	   as	   a	  
government-­‐administered	  protected	  landscape	  (IUCN	  category	  V)	  (Borrini-­‐Feyerabend	  et	  al.	  
2013)	   (Figure	   4,	   orange	   box	   labeled	   “Another	   option”).	   However,	   the	   strong	   influence	   of	  
neoliberal	   philosophy	   in	   Australia	   and	   lack	   of	   support	   from	   private	   landholders	   in	   the	  
Midlands	  render	  this	  reform	  option	  less	  practical	  than	  those	  to	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  triangle	  
(Figure	  4),	  which	  provide	  a	  mix	  of	   government-­‐,	   community-­‐	   and	  market-­‐oriented	   reform,	  
while	  pushing	  towards	  options	  that	  facilitate	  broader	  community	  engagement.	  	  
The	   increased	   community	   engagement	   focus	   of	   Options	   1	   (Landholder-­‐driven	  
Program)	  and	  2	  (Midlands	  Alliance)	  (Figure	  4,	  green	  boxes)	   is	  supported	  by	  theoretical	  and	  
case	   literature,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   current	   institutions	   as	  
identified	   by	   the	   institutional	   diagnosis	   (Table	   5).	   Case	   study	   literature	   suggests	   robust	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1Adapted	  from	  a	  representation	  of	  natural	  resource	  governance	  in	  Australia	  (Lockwood	  and	  Davidson	  2010).	  
The	  options	  that	  were	  selected	  are	  shown	  in	  green.	  
natural	   resource	   governance	   can	   be	   achieved	   through	   self-­‐organized	   networks	   (Ostrom	  
2009),	   although	   these	   case	   studies	   focus	   on	   common	   pool	   resource	   situations.	   Central	  
oversight	   is	   likely	  more	   important	   in	  biodiversity	   governance	   (Ring	  2008).	  A	  more	  explicit,	  
legally	  defined	  duty	  of	  care	  for	  biodiversity	  would	  support	  provision	  of	  this	  public	  good,	  with	  
flexibility	  to	  adapt	  to	  local	  conditions	  and	  environmental	  change	  (Earl	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  
Existing	   institutional	   conditions	   in	   the	  Midlands	  are	  amenable	   to	   reform	  options	   in	  
the	  more	  community-­‐	  and	  market-­‐oriented	  space.	  Importantly,	  governance	  possibilities	  here	  
can	   build	   on	   the	   strong	   institutional	   legacy	   of	   participation	   in	   conservation	   programs	   and	  
recent	   efforts	   to	   self-­‐organize.	   To	   achieve	   regional	   outcomes	   will	   require	   expanding	  
engagement	   to	   develop	   broader	   alliances	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   membership	   and	   geographic	  
scope	  (Kaljonen	  2008).	  The	  focus	  on	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  governance	  means	  Option	  1	  (Landholder-­‐
driven	  Program)	  is	  located	  towards	  the	  bottom	  right	  hand	  corner	  of	  the	  triangle	  in	  Figure	  4.	  	  
Table	  5	  Summary	  of	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  identified	  in	  the	  diagnostic	  (Tasmanian	  
Midlands)	  
Strengths	   Weaknesses	   Implications	  
•	  Governance	  actors	  recognize	  
the	  value	  of	  approaching	  the	  
Midlands	  as	  social-­‐ecological	  
system,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  desire	  to	  
bring	  together	  the	  natural	  and	  
human	  landscape	  elements.	  
•	  Institutional	  arrangements	  
neglect	  the	  need	  to	  address	  
ecosystem	  function,	  and	  focus	  
too	  narrowly	  on	  native	  
vegetation	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
other	  landscape	  values	  and	  
functions.	  	  
•	  The	  region	  is	  a	  good	  
candidate	  for	  pursuing	  
landscape-­‐scale	  
approaches	  encompassing	  
functional	  elements	  of	  
biodiversity	  in	  a	  landscape	  
characterized	  by	  
agricultural	  land	  uses.	  
•	  Strong	  entrepreneurial	  
leadership	  and	  a	  demonstrated	  
willingness	  for	  policy	  
innovations	  to	  address	  both	  the	  
needs	  of	  landholders	  and	  
requirements	  of	  biodiversity	  
conservation	  (e.g.	  Midlands	  
Conservation	  Fund,	  Tasmanian	  
Rangelands	  Group).	  
•	  Several	  attempts	  by	  
landholders	  and	  NGOs	  to	  self-­‐
organize	  and	  create	  new	  
approaches	  to	  conserve	  
biodiversity.	  
•	  A	  greater	  quantum	  and	  more	  
diverse	  funding	  sources	  are	  
needed	  to	  support	  these	  
efforts.	  	  
•	  Networks	  have	  struggled	  to	  
institutionalize	  their	  initiatives	  
and	  decision-­‐making	  powers.	  
•	  Governance	  should	  
move	  away	  from	  overly	  
prescriptive	  approaches	  to	  
enable	  innovation,	  seek	  
diverse	  sources	  of	  
funding,	  and	  build	  on	  
existing	  initiatives.	  	  
•	  Strong	  history	  of	  collaboration	  
between	  a	  core	  group	  of	  
landholders	  and	  key	  individuals	  
within	  government	  and	  (more	  
recently)	  environmental	  NGOs.	  	  
•	  Midlands	  Coordination	  Group	  
seeking	  to	  formalize	  this	  
collaboration.	  
•	  Collaboration	  has	  excluded	  
some	  groups,	  and	  focused	  on	  a	  
small	  subset	  of	  landholders.	  	  
•	  There	  are	  many	  visions,	  but	  a	  
shared	  vision	  covering	  a	  wide	  
spectrum	  of	  views	  is	  lacking.	  
•	  Collaboration	  provides	  a	  
strong	  foundation	  for	  
expanded	  efforts,	  but	  
needs	  to	  be	  inclusive	  of	  all	  
parties	  to	  develop	  and	  
implement	  a	  landscape-­‐
scale	  approach.	  	  
•	  Use	  of	  strategic	  assessment	  
under	  the	  EPBC	  Act	  to	  evaluate	  
the	  impacts	  of	  irrigation	  
represents	  an	  effort	  to	  take	  a	  
landscape-­‐scale	  approach.	  
•	  Authority	  under	  the	  EPBC	  
Act	  is	  weak	  and	  linked	  to	  
endangered	  species,	  making	  
strategic	  assessment	  a	  blunt	  
instrument	  to	  address	  
landscape-­‐level	  impacts.	  
•	  Poor	  buffering	  capacity	  to	  
respond	  adequately	  to	  
irrigation	  impacts,	  mitigate	  
external	  pressures	  (e.g.	  market	  
forces),	  and	  cope	  with	  
uncertainty.	  
•	  Strategic	  assessment	  is	  a	  
mechanism	  already	  in	  
legislation	  that	  could	  be	  
used	  for	  landscape-­‐scale	  
approaches.	  





Taking	  a	  more	  market-­‐oriented	  view	  enabled	  placement	  of	  governance	  possibilities	  
towards	  the	  top	  corner	  of	  the	  triangle	  (Figure	  4,	  Option	  2	  Midlands	  Alliance).	  The	  extensive	  
lessons	   learned	   from	   supporting	  multifunctional	   landscapes	   in	   Europe	   (Van	   Huylenbroeck	  
and	   Durand	   2003;	   O’Farrell	   and	   Anderson	   2010)	   suggested	   possibilities	   for	   reform	  
addressing	   both	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   ecological	   dimensions	   of	   the	   region.	  
Multifunctionality	   emerged	   inductively	   from	   the	   data	   as	   a	   goal	   orienting	   reforms,	  
responding	  to	  the	  need	  to	  embed	  biodiversity	  conservation	  considerations	  within	  a	  broader	  
agricultural	  context.	  Initiatives	  promoting	  multifunctional	  landscapes	  share	  the	  premise	  that	  
rural	   land	  owners	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  enhance	  ecological	  values,	  while	  also	  fostering	  
economic	  sustainability	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  capital	  (O’Farrell	  and	  Anderson	  2010).	  Both	  
options	   were	   deliberately	   located	   in	   the	   community-­‐market	   reform	   space	   of	   Figure	   4	   to	  
scaffold	   on	   the	   strengths	   of	   current	   approaches	   and	   address	   the	   constraints	   to	   adaptive,	  
landscape-­‐scale	  biodiversity	  governance.	  
4.3	  Design	  of	  reform	  options	  
	  The	  reform	  were	  designed	  to	  transition	  current	  governance	  arrangements	   towards	  
the	  two	  options,	  drawing	  on	  key	   findings	   from	  the	  diagnostic,	   supported	  by	  the	   literature,	  
and	  moderated	   by	   the	   results	   from	   the	   focus	   groups.	   The	  most	   significant	   change	   arising	  
from	  the	   focus	  groups	  was	  shifting	  one	  of	   the	   initial	  options	  more	   towards	  a	   ‘bottom-­‐up’,	  
self-­‐organizing	  model,	  inspired	  by	  models	  of	  self-­‐organized	  governance	  systems	  for	  irrigation	  
(Cox	  and	  Ross	  2011).	  Although	  there	  was	  general	  consensus	   that	  such	  a	  model	  was	  worth	  
pursuing,	  there	  was	  of	  course	  differing	  views	  on	  how	  autonomy	  and	  oversight	  should	  best	  
be	  balanced.	  To	  accommodate	  the	  public	  good	  nature	  of	  biodiversity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interest	  
in	  more	  autonomy,	  Option	  1	  starts	  as	  a	  landholder-­‐driven	  model,	  but	  would	  need	  to	  proceed	  
to	  broader	  community	  engagement	  and	  then	  develop	  a	  system	  of	  public	  oversight	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  regional	  plan	  of	  action.	  	  
While	  drawing	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  AG	  and	  multifunctional	   landscapes,	  both	  options	  
also	   scaffold	   on	   the	   strengths	   of	   current	   arrangements.	   They	   offer	   a	   way	   to	   reconfigure	  
institutional	   elements	   and	   provide	   support	   for	   innovations	   that	   have	   already	   been	  
introduced,	  while	  also	  addressing	  current	  weaknesses.	  	  
The	  first	  option,	   the	  Landholder-­‐Driven	  Regional	  Program	  of	  Action,	  was	  developed	  
to	  build	  on	  the	  Tasmanian	  Rangelands	  Group,	  and	  to	  draw	  on	  their	   inspiration,	  the	  Malpai	  
Borderlands	  Group	  (Sayre	  2005).	  Shifting	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  away	  from	  agencies	  toward	  
shared	  decision-­‐making	  with	   landholders	  has	  been	  a	   central	   goal	   in	   the	  Borderlands	   (York	  
and	   Schoon	   2011),	   and	   is	   incorporated	   into	   Option	   1.	   The	   second	   option,	   the	   Midlands	  
Alliance,	   is	   inspired	   by	   institutional	   arrangements	   for	   Regional	   Nature	   Parks	   in	   France	  
combining	  environmental	  protection,	   including	  preservation	  of	   landscapes	  and	  natural	  and	  
cultural	   heritage,	   and	   regional	   socio-­‐economic	   development	   (Dupraz	   and	   Rainelli	   2004;	  
Bardsley	   and	   Pech	   2012).	   This	   option	   also	   nudges	   governance	   toward	   market-­‐based	  
approaches,	  such	  as	  by	  encouraging	  accreditation	  schemes	  for	  agricultural	  produce.	  
Both	  options	  steer	  toward	  a	  fundamental	  re-­‐framing	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  to	  
explicitly	   integrate	  ecosystem	  function	  and	  the	  multiple	  social	  and	  ecological	  values	  of	   the	  
Midlands	  landscape.	  Re-­‐framing	  responds	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  findings	  that	  formal	  institutions	  
are	   focused	   too	   narrowly	   on	   protecting	   endangered	   species	   and	   ecological	   communities,	  
whereas	   there	   has	   been	   a	   shift	   in	   local	   views	   toward	   retaining	   and	   restoring	   ecosystem	  
function	  in	  a	  ‘working’	  agricultural	  landscape	  as	  a	  more	  appropriate	  goal.	  Re-­‐framing	  of	  this	  
sort	  is	  not	  only	  a	  more	  realistic	  goal	  in	  highly	  modified	  landscapes	  (Curtis	  and	  Lefroy	  2010)	  
but	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  paradigms	  of	  ecosystem	  management	  must	  change	  to	  cope	  with	  
emerging	   novel	   ecosystem	   types	   (Hobbs	   et	   al.	   2013).	   The	   principles	   behind	  
multifunctionality	   underpin	   both	   options	   (Reyers	   et	   al.	   2012),	   and	   provide	   guidance	   for	  
reframing	  institutional	  arrangements	  beyond	  listed	  values	  toward	  more	  holistic	  solutions.	  
Option	  1	  seeks	  to	  provide	  rights	  and	  incentives	  to	  self-­‐organize	  (Chapin	  III	  et	  al.	  2012)	  
and	   starts	   with	   a	   working	   group	   of	   local	   landholders	   and	   organizational	   representatives	  
taking	   the	   lead	   in	  development	  of	   a	   comprehensive	  program	  of	   action,	  with	   seed	   funding	  
provided	  by	  the	  state	  and	  federal	  governments.	  To	  address	  needs	  identified	  in	  the	  diagnostic	  
(Table	   5),	   this	   group	   would	   develop	   a	   regional	   program	   of	   action	   to:	   i)	   provide	   a	   shared	  
vision;	   ii)	   identify	  priority	   values	   to	  enhance	   landscape	   functions;	   iii)	   identify	  planning	  and	  
land	  use	  options;	   iv)	   provide	  a	  plan	   for	   implementation;	   and	  v)	  mechanisms	   for	   reflection	  
and	   revision.	   This	   responds	   to	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   overly	   prescriptive	   agri-­‐environmental	  
schemes	   in	  Europe,	  and	  draws	   inspiration	   from	  the	  results-­‐oriented	  approach	  of	  de	  Sainte	  
Marie	  (2014).	  
Option	  2	  has	  a	  greater	  market	  emphasis	  through	  its	  focus	  on	  rural	  development	  and	  
suggests	   a	   wider	   coalition	   from	   the	   outset,	   with	   government	   and	   non-­‐government	  
organizations	  and	  landholders	  collaboratively	  pursuing	  development	  of	  an	  alliance.	  Building	  
on	  current	  approaches,	   it	  would	  broaden	  membership	  in	  the	  Midlands	  Coordination	  Group	  
to	   include	   more	   landholder	   representation	   and	   strengthen	   capacity	   to	   implement	   the	  
Conservation	   Action	   Plan	   already	   in	   place.	   The	   alliance	   could	   be	   cemented	   in	   a	   charter	  
ratified	   by	   the	   Tasmanian	   Parliament	   to	   formalize	   the	   approach	   and	   ensure	   democratic	  
oversight	  of	  the	  process	  through	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  parliament.	  
The	   diagnosis	   raised	   concerns	   that	   current	   institutional	   arrangements	   provide	   too	  
little	  authority	  to	  buffer	  ecosystems	  and	  ensure	  the	  ongoing	  conservation	  of	  biodiversity	  in	  
the	  public	   interest.	  Devolving	  more	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  to	   landholders	  and	  adopting	  a	  
more	  participatory	  approach	  would	  help	  address	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  overly	  prescriptive	  
and	   decontextualized	   approach	   to	   multifunctional	   landscapes	   in	   Europe	   (Lehmann	   et	   al.	  
2009).	  Devolution	  was	  a	   troubling	  prospect	   for	   some	   focus	  group	  participants;	  particularly	  
government	  actors	  who	  need	  to	  ensure	  statutory	  responsibilities	  are	  met.	  	  
As	  a	  public	  good	  on	  private	  land,	  both	  reforms	  had	  to	  consider	  the	  requirement	  for	  
some	   level	   of	   central	   authority	   and	   policy-­‐setting	   in	   biodiversity	   governance	   (Ring	   2008),	  
while	  balancing	  this	  against	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  and	  the	  need	  to	  be	  more	  responsive	  
to	   conditions	   ‘on	   the	   ground’	   (Paavola	   et	   al.	   2009).	   Despite	   strong	   and	   widely-­‐held	  
stakeholder	   preferences	   for	   non-­‐government,	   norm-­‐based	   approaches,	   this	   highlights	   the	  
need	   for	   a	   polycentric	   institutional	   design,	   with	   governments	   providing	   a	   space	   where	  
landholder	   visions	   and	   strategies	   can	  be	   tested	  against	   the	  wider	  public	   interest	   including	  
Australia’s	  international	  responsibilities	  under	  the	  CBD.	  	  
While	  both	  options	  strive	   for	  more	   interactive	  governance	  (Torfing	  et	  al.	  2012)	  and	  
greater	  individual	  agency,	  biodiversity	  requires	  structures	  to	  ensure	  its	  delivery.	  The	  concept	  
of	   situational	   contracting	   offers	   guidance	   for	   how	   this	   could	   be	   applied,	   particularly	   in	  
Option	   1.	   Drawing	   on	   experience	   in	   the	   Netherlands,	   the	   approach	   provides	   for	   greater	  
agency	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  decision-­‐making	  within	  a	  structure	  (e.g.	  protocol)	  agreed	  upon	  by	  a	  
plurality	   of	   interests	   (Wolfson	   2012).	   Critically,	   it	   still	   includes	   oversight	   of	   a	   public	  
gatekeeper	  and	  acknowledges	  even	  good	  faith	  efforts	  can	  fail,	  making	  it	  a	  good	  compromise	  
between	  the	  more	  prescriptive	  approaches	  of	   the	  past	  and	  the	   fully	   flexible	  arrangements	  
desired	  by	  some	  landholders.	  
Both	   options	   also	   encourage	   reliance	   on	   a	   portfolio	   of	   biodiversity	   conservation	  
mechanisms	   and	   include	   liaison	   with	   and	   oversight	   by	   government	   actors	   to	   ensure	   the	  
programs	   deliver	   on	   biodiversity	   outcomes	   for	   the	   broader	   public	   good.	   The	   strategic	  
behavior	   of	   landholders	   and	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   payment	   for	   conservation	   found	   in	   the	  
diagnostic	  suggest	  economic	  incentives	  should	  be	  part	  of	  the	  mix	  if	  institutions	  are	  to	  have	  
an	  effect.	  Both	  options	  scaffold	  on	  the	  existing	  Midlands	  Conservation	  Fund	  as	  one	  source	  of	  
perpetual	  funding	  outside	  of	  government.	  
Under	   both	   options	   there	   is	   the	   opportunity	   to	   take	   a	   creative	   approach	   to	   the	  
formal	  devolution	  of	  authority	  within	  the	  existing	  statutory	  framework.	  A	  regional	  planning	  
exercise	  could	  be	  undertaken	  and	  then	  assessed	  and	  approved	  under	  strategic	  assessment	  
provisions	  in	  Part	  10	  of	  the	  EPBC	  Act.	  A	  resultant	  regional	  program	  of	  action	  could	  then	  be	  
developed	   and	   implemented	   under	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   federal	   government	   to	  
strategically	  consider	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Midlands	  as	  a	  multifunctional	  landscape	  –	  an	  advance	  
on	  the	  recently	  completed	  MWS	  Strategic	  Assessment	  where	  the	  narrow	  terms	  of	  reference	  
focused	   only	   on	   irrigation	   and	   precluded	   consideration	   of	   biodiversity	   values	   beyond	  
narrowly	  defined	  matters	  of	  national	  significance	  (which	  focus	  on	  listed	  threatened	  species	  
and	   communities).	   This	   takes	   advantage	   of	   an	   institutional	   change	   process	   of	   conversion,	  
where	   repurposing	   rules	   can	   lead	   to	   significant	   institutional	   change	   (Mahoney	  and	  Thelen	  
2010).	  	  
Both	  options	  also	   focus	  on	  strategies	   to	  build	  buffering	  capacity.	  Case	  studies	  have	  
shown	   successful	   buffering	   strategies	   include	   networking;	   objective	   setting,	   planning,	   and	  
backup;	  and	  having	  vision	  and	  strategies	   for	  unknowns	   (O'Toole	  and	  Meier	  2011;	  Termeer	  
and	  van	  den	  Brink	  2012;	  Boyd	  and	  Folke	  2011).	  The	   formalized	  Alliance	   is	  one	  such	  buffer	  
(Option	   2),	   through	   clarifying	   and	   potentially	   formalizing	   management	   directions	   and	  
responsibilities	   for	   the	  Midlands	   landscape.	   The	   landholder-­‐driven	   Option	   1	   could	   have	   a	  
similar	   buffering	   capacity	   if	   the	   networked	   governance	   associated	   with	   it	   is	   sufficiently	  
engaged	  and	  robust	  to	  resist	  challenges	  to	  its	  authority.	  	  
5.	  Australian	  Alps	  reforms:	  Enhancing	  cross-­‐border	  authority	  and	  enabling	  manager	  
discretion	  
5.1	  Reform	  space	  
The	  reform	  space	  for	  the	  Australian	  Alps	  is	  defined	  by	  features	  of	  the	  region	  relevant	  
to	  biodiversity	  governance	  and	  Australia’s	  system	  of	  cooperative	  federalism.	  The	  Australian	  
Alps	  is	  a	  mountainous	  bioregion	  spanning	  the	  states	  of	  Victoria	  and	  New	  South	  Wales	  (NSW)	  
and	   the	   Australian	   Capital	   Territory	   (ACT)	   (Figure	   5).	   It	   is	   unique	   in	   this	   relatively	   flat	  
continent	  and	  is	  recognized	  internationally	  as	  a	  world	  center	  for	  plant	  diversity	  (Davis	  et	  al.	  
1994).	  Reserved	  as	  a	  series	  of	  national	  parks	  and	  federally	  listed	  as	  a	  National	  Heritage	  Place	  
under	  the	  EPBC	  Act,	  its	  land	  tenure	  is	  secure,	  but	  its	  endemic	  alpine	  species	  still	  face	  threats	  
from	   invasive	   plants	   and	   animals,	   climate	   change,	   and	   dwindling	   public	   resourcing	   for	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  (Lockwood	  et	  al.	  2014).	  	  
Like	  many	   bioregions,	   the	   Australian	   Alps	   landscapes	   are	   artificially	   fragmented	   by	  
jurisdictional	  boundaries.	  Formal	  responsibility	  for	   land	  and	  biodiversity	  management	  rests	  
with	   the	   state	   and	   territory	   park	   management	   and	   environmental	   agencies,	   and	   each	  
jurisdiction	  has	  dozens	  of	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  conservation,	  presenting	  
many	   of	   the	   same	   challenges	   seen	   in	   international	   transboundary	   protected	   areas.	   To	  
address	  such	  challenges,	  the	  three	  state/territory	   jurisdictions	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  
collectively	   run	   the	   Australian	   Alps	   National	   Parks	   Cooperative	   Management	   Program.	  
Initiated	  by	  a	   group	  of	  park	  agency	  managers	   to	   increase	   cooperation	  across	  borders,	   the	  
program	  has	   operated	  under	   a	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	   (MOU)	   since	   1986	   (Crabb	  
and	   Dovers	   2007).	   The	   program	   has	   a	   strategic	   plan	   outlining	   cooperative	   management	  
activities	   and	   a	   central	   coordinating	   body,	   the	   Australian	   Alps	   Liaison	   Committee	   (AALC).	  
Although	   this	   arrangement	   has	   been	   strong	   and	   flexible	   enough	   to	   survive	   political	   and	  
funding	  cycles,	  major	  fire	  events,	  and	  contentious	  management	  issues	  such	  as	  cattle	  grazing	  
in	  the	  Victorian	  Alps,	  it	  has	  struggled	  to	  effectively	  deal	  with	  some	  of	  the	  vexing	  cross-­‐border	  
issues	  impacting	  biodiversity	  (e.g.	  feral	  horses)	  (Crabb	  and	  Dovers	  2007).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5	  Location	  map	  of	  Australian	  Alps	  protected	  areas	  
The	  factors	  bounding	  the	  reform	  space,	  based	  on	  this	  knowledge	  of	   the	  case	  study	  
region	  and	  how	  this	  influences	  governance	  design,	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  6.	  Land	  tenure	  
and	   the	   constitutional	   role	   of	   states	   in	   management	   of	   national	   parks	   were	   key	  
considerations.	  While	  pursuit	  of	  options	  to	  enable	  truly	  ‘national’	  national	  parks	  in	  Australia	  
is	   technically	   possible,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   strong	   political	   support	   from	   all	  
jurisdictions	  and	  would	  not	  –	  by	  itself	  –	  address	  the	  issues	  identified	  in	  the	  diagnosis.	  
	  
Table	  6	  Institutional	  elements	  bounding	  reform	  options	  in	  the	  Australian	  Alps	  
Institutional	  element	   Implications	  for	  governance	  options	  
Under	  the	  constitution,	  the	  states	  have	  
responsibility	  for	  land	  management,	  and	  
history	  suggests	  constitutional	  change	  in	  
Australia	  is	  difficult	  (Bates	  2010).	  Each	  
state	  and	  territory	  has	  its	  own	  legislation	  
and	  regulations	  directing	  how	  their	  
constitutional	  responsibilities	  will	  be	  
delivered.	  
Limits	  federal	  government	  involvement.	  
Truly	  ‘national’	  national	  parks,	  in	  the	  
sense	  the	  federal	  government	  
establishes	  them,	  only	  exist	  in	  Australian	  
territories.	  Shifting	  to	  such	  an	  
arrangement	  in	  the	  Alps	  is	  politically	  
untenable.	  Cross-­‐border	  success	  will	  
continue	  to	  be	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  
political	  support	  and	  willingness	  to	  
collaborate	  across	  jurisdictions	  (Steele	  et	  
al.	  2013).	  	  
Biodiversity	  is	  a	  public	  good,	  and	  the	  
communities	  of	  interest	  extend	  far	  
beyond	  local	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  
agencies	  that	  manage	  them.	  	  
The	  public	  interest	  aspect	  of	  biodiversity	  
suggests	  the	  current	  government-­‐centric	  
arrangements,	  where	  these	  agencies	  can	  
manage	  for	  the	  public	  good,	  are	  likely	  to	  
persist	  in	  tandem	  with	  new	  approaches.	  
Biodiversity	  management	  responsibilities	  
and	  strategies	  are	  strongly	  determined	  
by	  land	  tenure,	  and	  the	  alpine	  national	  
parks	  are	  publicly	  owned.	  
Current	  land	  tenure	  of	  the	  Alps	  as	  
national	  parks	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  
unchanged,	  although	  the	  management	  
emphases	  of	  the	  public	  management	  
agencies	  may	  vary	  over	  time,	  and	  be	  
influenced	  by	  politics.	  Privatization	  and	  
private	  ownership	  is	  highly	  unlikely.	  
Australians	  have	  a	  strong	  cultural	  
commitment	  to	  national	  parks	  but	  
conflicts	  between	  use	  and	  non-­‐use	  
values	  have	  been	  a	  common	  feature	  in	  
the	  Australian	  Alps,	  and	  public	  use	  and	  
perception	  of	  the	  parks	  have	  changed	  
over	  time.	  
Biodiversity	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  to	  have	  
primacy	  as	  a	  park	  purpose	  indefinitely,	  
and	  its	  valuing	  by	  society	  may	  change	  as	  
societal	  values	  change.	  
	  
5.2	  Reform	  mapping	  
As	  with	   the	  Midlands	  case	   study,	   the	  move	   from	  reform	  space	   to	  mapping	  potential	  
reform	  directions	  involved	  interrogating	  good-­‐practice	  case	  studies	  and	  theoretical	  literature	  
to	   identify	   ways	   of	   addressing	   results	   from	   the	   diagnostic.	   The	   reform	  map	   for	   the	   Alps	  
includes	  a	   larger	  number	  of	  options	   than	   for	   the	  Midlands,	   inspired	  by	   the	  strong	  body	  of	  
case	   studies	   and	   literature	   on	   governance	   designs	   for	   protected	   areas.	   Options	   were	  
considered	   in	   terms	   of	   whether	   they	   favor	   community-­‐	   or	   government-­‐based	   solutions	  
(Figure	  6).	  The	  current	  arrangement	  (colored	  orange)	  lies	  between	  the	  two	  options	  pursued	  
in	  the	  next	  stage	  (colored	  green),	  with	  one	  option	  expanding	  community	  engagement	  with	  
park	  management	   through	   informal	  means	   (Option	   1,	   One	   Park	   One	   Plan)	   and	   the	   other	  
expanding	   engagement	   through	   a	   more	   formal,	   legislative	   approach	   (Option	   2,	  
Transboundary	  Statutory	  Authority)	  (Figure	  6).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6	  Map	  of	  governance	  possibilities	  for	  the	  Australian	  Alps2	  
	  
Although	  the	  spectrum	  of	  options	  was	  broader	  than	  for	   the	  Midlands,	  ultimately	  the	  
two	  central	  options	  were	  selected	  and	  supported	  by	  focus	  group	  participants	  because	  they	  
addressed	   issues	   identified	   in	   the	   diagnosis	   (Table	   7),	   while	   making	   the	   best	   use	   of	   the	  
institutional	  legacy.	  The	  research	  team	  initially	  selected	  an	  option	  that	  was	  more	  toward	  the	  
community	  end	  of	   the	  spectrum	   in	  Figure	  6,	  but	   focus	  group	  participants	   thought	   the	  two	  
center	   options	   to	   be	   both	   more	   feasible	   and	   less	   likely	   to	   generate	   perverse	   outcomes.	  
There	  was	  very	   little	  support	   in	  the	  focus	  groups	  for	  options	  moving	  toward	  public-­‐private	  
partnerships	   with	   the	   tourism	   industry	   and	   community	   groups,	   with	   participants	   echoing	  
concerns	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  their	  implications	  for	  good	  governance	  (Eagles	  2009).	  
Landscape-­‐scale	  conservation	  emerged	   inductively	  as	  a	  second	  aspiration	  (along	  with	  
AG)	   guiding	   reform	   design.	   The	   need	   to	   foster	   cross-­‐jurisdictional	   governance	   was	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Based	  on	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  IUCN’s	  classification	  of	  protected	  area	  governance	  (Dudley	  2008).	  The	  
options	  described	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  shown	  in	  green.	  
prominent	   concern	   in	   this	   government-­‐managed	   protected	   area,	   where	   large-­‐scale	  
processes	  (e.g.	  fire,	  feral	  horses,	  climate	  change)	  threaten	  biodiversity	  values.	  It	  is	  also	  in	  line	  
with	   ecological	   critiques	   that	   biodiversity	   institutions	   are	   too	   focused	   on	   protecting	  
endangered	  species,	  and	  better	  biodiversity	  outcomes	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  adopting	  larger-­‐
scaled	  approaches	  (Pasari	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Gonthier	  et	  al.	  2014).	  	  
	  
	  
Table	  7	  Summary	  of	  diagnostic	  results	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  reform	  (Australian	  Alps)	  
Strengths	   Weaknesses	   Implications	  
•	  Strong	  history	  of	  
transboundary	  
cooperation	  that	  




•	  Program	  is	  currently	  in	  a	  lull	  
and	  collaborative	  activities	  are	  
still	  ‘add-­‐ons’	  to	  core	  activities	  
of	  agency	  managers.	  
•	  Program	  activities	  are	  
strongly	  influenced	  by	  politics	  
within	  each	  jurisdiction,	  
impeding	  a	  cohesive	  approach	  
for	  significant	  cross-­‐border	  
issues	  such	  as	  fire,	  feral	  
horses,	  and	  climate	  change.	  
•	  Cooperative	  program	  
provides	  a	  strong	  
foundation,	  but	  the	  
program	  is	  in	  need	  of	  
renewal	  and	  champions	  
who	  ensure	  collaborative	  
activities	  are	  supported	  
within	  the	  agencies	  and	  by	  
governments.	  
•	  Mechanisms	  to	  enable	  a	  
more	  cohesive	  approach	  
on	  significant	  cross-­‐border	  
issues	  are	  required.	  
•	  Agencies	  have	  
intentionally	  focused	  
on	  improving	  capacity	  
to	  adaptively	  manage	  
and	  link	  actions	  on	  
the	  ground	  to	  priority	  
assets.	  Managers	  
demonstrated	  
awareness	  of	  what	  
still	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  
and	  a	  willingness	  to	  
improve.	  	  
•	  In	  addition	  to	  tight	  
government	  budgets,	  most	  
funding	  is	  tied	  to	  specific	  
projects	  and	  actions,	  limiting	  
continuity,	  innovation	  and	  
flexibility	  to	  adapt.	  
•	  Accountability	  mechanisms	  
narrowly	  focus	  on	  how	  funds	  
are	  spent	  and	  discourage	  the	  
error-­‐correction	  mechanisms	  
required	  for	  reflexive	  learning.	  
•	  Need	  for	  more	  recurrent	  
funding	  and	  diversification	  




mechanisms	  must	  focus	  
not	  just	  on	  finances	  and	  
outputs,	  but	  also	  on	  
biodiversity	  and	  learning	  
outcomes.	  	  
•	  Strong	  scientific	  
interest	  in	  the	  
Australian	  Alps	  means	  
high	  quality	  research	  
is	  available	  to	  support	  
management.	  
•	  Move	  toward	  more	  
generalist	  employees	  and	  an	  
erosion	  of	  specialist	  expertise	  
within	  agencies.	  
•	  Need	  to	  support	  scientific	  
research	  and	  identify	  
opportunities	  to	  better	  




relatively	  clear	  in	  the	  
Alps	  due	  to	  its	  
•	  Erosion	  of	  trust	  in	  public	  
agencies	  has	  led	  to	  more	  
control-­‐oriented	  structures,	  
constraining	  mid-­‐level	  
•	  Developing	  a	  wider	  
coalition	  of	  community	  
support	  for	  and	  
understanding	  of	  parks	  is	  
Strengths	   Weaknesses	   Implications	  
protected	  area	  status.	  	   manager	  discretion.	  
•	  Growing	  influence	  of	  anti-­‐
park	  constituencies	  and	  
associated	  political	  pressure	  
disempowers	  managers	  and	  
deters	  them	  from	  providing	  
‘frank	  and	  fearless’	  advice.	  
critical.	  
•	  Institutions	  need	  to	  
devolve	  sufficient	  
autonomy	  to	  let	  the	  
managers	  manage.	  
•	  Need	  to	  buffer	  against	  
political	  influences	  and	  
work	  more	  productively	  
with	  these	  influences.	  
	  
5.3	  Design	  of	  reform	  options	  
The	  two	  reform	  options	  for	  the	  Alps	  draw	  on	  key	  findings	  from	  applying	  the	  diagnostic	  
framework,	  supported	  by	  the	  literature,	  and	  moderated	  by	  the	  results	  from	  the	  focus	  groups.	  
Both	  options	  use	  the	  cooperative	  program	  as	  scaffolding,	  while	  identifying	  opportunities	  to	  
address	  the	  weaknesses	  highlighted	  by	  the	  diagnosis.	  Focus	  group	  participants	   judged	  that	  
pathways	   to	   achieving	   the	   reform	  options	  were	  more	   important	   than	   the	   final	   structures,	  
and	   were	   keen	   to	   build	   on	   the	   strengths	   of	   the	   cooperative	   program.	   Focus	   group	  
participants	   were	   also	   uncomfortable	   with	   moving	   toward	   options	   that	   involved	   more	  
private	  partnerships,	  based	  on	  a	  view	  that	   this	  could	  compromise	  the	  good	  governance	  of	  
these	   publicly-­‐owned	   protected	   landscapes.	   These	   views	   informed	   changes	   to	   Option	   1,	  
resulting	  in	  its	  movement	  towards	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  	  
Participants	   saw	   merit	   in	   a	   statutory	   authority,	   given	   transboundary	   protection	   is	  
difficult	  to	  achieve	  without	  a	  joint	  authority	  based	  in	  law	  (Brenner	  and	  Davis	  2012),	  and	  the	  
potential	  of	  such	  an	  authority	  to	  foster	  ecosystem-­‐based	  management	  and	  improvements	  in	  
ecological	   outcomes	   (Olsson	   et	   al.	   2008;	   Evans	   et	   al.	   2014).	   This	   option	   was	   adopted	  
cautiously,	  given	  the	  rocky	  history	  of	  similar	  statutory	  authorities	  in	  Australia.	  This	  made	  the	  
‘pathway’	   approach	   more	   appealing	   as	   well,	   recognizing	   that	   institutional	   design	   of	   a	  
statutory	   authority	   for	   the	   Alps	   would	   need	   to	   address	   the	   weaknesses	   seen	   in	   other	  
Australian	  examples	  (e.g.	  social	  learning,	  community	  engagement,	  and	  addressing	  social	  and	  
ecological	  influences	  external	  to	  the	  system)	  (Connell	  and	  Grafton	  2011;	  Evans	  et	  al.	  2014).	  
	  As	   such,	   the	   reform	   options	   were	   discussed	   as	   potential	   endpoints	   to	   provide	   a	  
vision	  of	  where	  efforts	  to	  build	  on	  the	  cooperative	  program	  and	  enhance	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
cooperation	  might	   lead.	  Both	  move	  toward	  a	  more	  cohesive	  approach;	  however,	  Option	  1	  
adopts	  a	  more	  networked	  structure	  and	  attempts	  to	  productively	  use	  jurisdictional	  diversity	  
for	   intentional	   experimentation	   (Sabel	   and	   Zeitlin	   2010).	   Option	   2	  moves	   toward	   a	  more	  
formal	  approach	  of	  a	  statutory	  authority,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  buffer	  against	  inter-­‐jurisdictional	  
politics.	  	  
Designing	   governance	   options	   for	   the	   Alps	   to	   achieve	   a	  more	   cohesive	   landscape-­‐
scale	   approach	   was	   complicated	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   retain	   the	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	   legacy	   of	   the	  
cooperative	   program	   while	   also	   building	   competencies	   to	   better	   deal	   with	   cross-­‐border	  
collaboration.	  Decades	  of	  on-­‐ground	  collaboration	  have	  built	  competency	  to	  solve	  problems	  
at	  the	  operational	  level,	  giving	  the	  cooperative	  program	  greater	  capacity	  to	  manage	  the	  Alps	  
as	  a	  borderless	   landscape	  than	  would	  be	  the	  case	  with	  a	  fully	  top-­‐down	  approach	  (Schoon	  
2013).	   Option	   2	  will	   thus	   have	   to	   be	   carefully	   developed	   and	   driven	   by	  middle	  managers	  
within	   the	   agencies,	   and	   both	   options	   require	   champions	   to	   re-­‐invigorate	   and	   ensure	  
collaboration	   is	  supported	  by	  the	  agencies	  and	  successes	  championed	  at	   the	  political	   level	  
(Imperial	  2005;	  Thomas	  2003;	  Boyd	  and	  Folke	  2011).	  Middle	  managers,	  rather	  than	  street-­‐
level	  bureaucrats,	  are	  the	  focus	  because	  they	  are	  where	  ‘top-­‐down’	  and	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  meet	  
(Fung	  2004;	  Ansell	  2011).	  Such	  managers	  would	   include,	   for	  example,	  district	  and	  regional	  
managers,	  who	  are	  both	  directly	  connected	  to	  the	  Alps	  and	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  higher-­‐
level	  objectives	  are	  met.	  	  
Approaches	  to	  reshape	  the	  accountability	  dimension	  of	  good	  governance	  and	  enable	  
middle	  manager	   discretion	   are	   central	   to	  moving	   beyond	   present	   path	   dependencies	   and	  
forming	   new	   institutional	   pathways.	   The	   diagnostic	   findings	   highlighted	   narrowly-­‐defined	  
accountabilities,	  focusing	  on	  the	  financial	  dimensions	  and	  measures	  that	  seek	  to	  control	  the	  
behavior	  of	  public	  agencies	  (Table	  7).	  Seeking	  greater	  control	  to	  manage	  risk	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  
phenomenon	  in	  the	  public	  service	  and	  even	  NGOs.	  Control-­‐oriented	  accountability	  reduces	  
organizational	   performance	   (Salamon	   and	   Robinson	   2008),	   blocks	   reflexive	   learning	   and	  
innovation	  (Ebrahim	  2005),	  and	  can	  even	  deter	  competent	  individuals	  from	  working	  for	  the	  
public	   service	   (Behn	   2001).	   Discretion	   is	   necessary	   for	   solving	   problems	   and	   can	   facilitate	  
interagency	  cooperation	  (Thomas	  2003).	  	  
Drawing	  inspiration	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  “accountable	  autonomy”	  borne	  out	  of	  case	  
studies	   in	   public	   schools	   and	   community	   policing	   (Fung	   2004),	   both	   options	   include	  
strategies	   to	  enable	  middle	  manager	  discretion	  whilst	   striving	   for	  a	  broader	  conception	  of	  
accountability.	   Accountable	   autonomy	   strives	   to	   achieve	   a	   balance	   between	   centralized	  
support	  and	  local	  autonomy	  to	  avoid	  the	  problems	  of	  both	  extremes,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  
building	   competence	   to	   achieve	   public	   ends	   (Fung	   2004).	   Pragmatism	   suggests	   cultivating	  
responsibility	  within	   agencies	   as	   a	   replacement	   for	   narrow,	   external	   accountability	   (Ansell	  
2011).	  	  
In	  Option	  1	  (One	  Park	  One	  Plan),	  middle	  managers	  would	  be	  given	  more	  discretion,	  
but	   would	   also	   be	   given	   the	   responsibility	   for	   achieving	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   landscape-­‐scale	  
management	  plan.	  This	  model	  partially	  decentralizes	  decision-­‐making	  to	  middle	  managers,	  
where	   ‘top-­‐down’	  and	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	  meet	   (Ansell	  2011).	  Option	  2	   (Transboundary	  Statutory	  
Authority)	  adds	  a	  statutory	  layer	  over	  this	  model,	  by	  suggesting	  the	  development	  of	  a	  clear	  
purpose	  and	  specified	  biodiversity	  outcomes	  and	  then	  giving	  the	  Authority	  power	  to	  devolve	  
responsibility	   to	   lower	   levels.	   The	   Authority	   would	   be	   accountable	   to	   these	   outcomes	   in	  
legislation,	  with	  public	  reporting	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  enabling	  legislation	  to	  ensure	  downward	  
accountability	   as	   well	   as	   upward	   accountability.	   Critically,	   both	   options	   must	   provide	  
autonomy	  and	  cultivate	  responsibility	  internally	  and	  not	  just	  through	  external	  checks.	  	  
Buffering	   against	   external	   influences,	   particularly	   those	   from	   the	   community	   and	  
political	   sphere,	   was	   identified	   as	   a	   weak	   area	   in	   the	   diagnosis.	   The	   accountability	  
mechanisms	  outlined	  above	  for	  Option	  2	  acts	  not	  only	  as	  a	  check	  on	  regional	  and	  local	  action,	  
but	  also	  to	  buffer	  against	  political	  influences	  by	  ensuring	  too	  much	  power	  is	  not	  invested	  in	  
any	  one	   individual,	   including	  any	  one	  minister.	  Option	  1	  approaches	   this	  by	  building	  more	  
partnerships	   with	   community	   and	   the	   tourism	   industry,	   as	   building	   networks	   foster	  
organizational	   conditions	   to	   deal	   with	   external	   influences	   and	   ‘unknown	   unknowns’	  
(Termeer	  and	  van	  den	  Brink	  2012;	  O'Toole	  and	  Meier	  2011).	  	  
There	   is	   a	   role	   for	   science	   in	   buffering	   and	   building	   more	   adaptive,	   collaborative	  
institutions.	   The	   diagnosis	   suggests	   relationships	   between	   science	   and	   management	   are	  
already	  strong	  in	  the	  Alps,	  but	  that	  political	  pressure	  and	  the	  erosion	  of	  specialist	  expertise	  
within	  agencies	  are	  undermining	  evidence-­‐based	  decision-­‐making.	  Networks	  of	  scientists,	  as	  
epistemic	   communities	   with	   recognized	   expertise,	   can	   exert	   a	   strong	   influence	   on	  
organizational	  learning	  and	  behavior.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  in	  the	  USA,	  the	  
level	   of	   interagency	   collaboration	   was	   positively	   influenced	   by	   consensual	   agreement	   by	  
conservation	   biologists	   that	   achieving	   conservation	   outcomes	   requires	   cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
collaboration	   (Thomas	   2003).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   these	   same	   case	   studies	   highlight	   that	  
“ideas…do	  not	  simply	  become	  policy”	  (Thomas	  2003;	  p.	  264).	  Rather,	  scientific	  solutions	  are	  
most	  successful	  when	  they	  address	  political	  problems,	  and	  this	  is	  an	  approach	  that	  could	  be	  
enhanced	  in	  the	  Alps.	  
Both	  options	  recommend	  the	  development	  of	  a	  research	  center	  focused	  on	  the	  Alps	  
to	  address	  these	  issues,	  coupled	  with	  strategies	  to	  attract	  more	  diverse	  funding	  sources.	  To	  
address	   the	   issues	   of	   community	   disillusionment	   with	   some	   aspects	   of	   Australian	   Alps	  
management	   (e.g.	   feral	  horses),	  we	  suggest	   the	  development	  of	  such	  a	  center	  not	  neglect	  
the	   social	   dimensions	   of	   research,	  which	   could	  mean	   adopting	   a	   social-­‐ecological	   systems	  
approach.	  Funding	  will	  need	  to	  accompany	  such	  a	  center,	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	  there	   is	  a	  
need	  to	  address	  the	  lack	  of	  diverse,	  recurring	  funding	  for	  the	  Alps.	  The	  Authority	  in	  Option	  2	  
opens	  new	  avenues	  for	  funding,	  as	  it	  addresses	  the	  problem	  that	  the	  cooperative	  program	  is	  
unable	   to	   access	   funding	   under	   its	   current	   MOU	   arrangement.	   With	   Option	   1,	   the	  
cooperative	  program	  may	  choose	  to	  become	  an	  incorporated	  body	  to	  address	  this	  issue,	  as	  
has	  been	  achieved	  by	  several	  other	  landscape-­‐scale	  collaborations	  in	  Australia	  (Fitzsimons	  et	  
al.	  2013).	  There	  is	  no	  single	  funding	  model	  shown	  to	  be	  ‘best’	  in	  the	  literature,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  
wealth	  of	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  fund	  protected	  areas	  and	  access	  multiple	  sources	  of	  funding	  
(Emerton	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  
6.	  Discussion	  and	  conclusion	  	  
Using	  insights	  from	  pragmatism,	  we	  have	  outlined	  an	  approach	  to	  designing	  adaptive	  
biodiversity	   conservation	   institutions	   building	   on	   existing	   competencies	   as	   scaffolding	   for	  
developing	   capacity	   and	   adaptive	   capacity.	   We	   have	   specifically	   used	   pragmatism	   and	  
congruent	  concepts	   in	   the	   institutional	   literature	   to	  address	   the	  recognized	  weaknesses	  of	  
AG	   such	   as	   neglecting	   the	   socio-­‐political	   context	   and	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	   the	   context-­‐
dependency	   of	   institutional	   arrangements	   (Cote	   and	   Nightingale	   2012).	   Throughout	   this	  
paper	  we	  have	  acknowledged	  these	  weaknesses	  of	  AG	  while	  continuing	   to	  pursue	   it	  as	  an	  
ideal,	  with	  pragmatism	  promulgated	  as	  a	  means	  of	  doing	  so.	  The	  concept	  of	  scaffolding	  has	  
particularly	   helped	   address	   the	   importance,	   in	   designing	   reforms,	   of	   building	   on	   existing	  
institutional	   elements,	  while	   also	   introducing	   new	   institutional	   elements	   to	   address	   areas	  
where	  competence	  is	  weak.	  	  
The	   pragmatist	   concept	   of	   scaffolding	   offers	   an	   approach	   to	   retain	   the	   cumulative	  
knowledge	  embedded	  in	  institutions,	  while	  also	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  need	  for	  large-­‐scale	  
institutional	  change	  (Ansell	  2011)	  designed	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  AG	  in	  mind,	  where	  the	  context	  is	  
also	   taken	   into	   account.	   In	   the	   Alps,	   for	   example,	   efforts	   to	   collaborate	   across	   borders,	  
although	  offering	  a	  basis	   for	   institutional	  development	   into	   the	   future,	  have	   reached	   their	  
limits	  without	  more	   comprehensive	   changes.	   To	  achieve	   the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	   an	  adaptive,	  
landscape-­‐scale	  approach	  to	  biodiversity	  conservation,	  the	  reform	  options	  focus	  on	  further	  
changes	  enabling	  middle	  manager	  discretion	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  achieve	  and	  how	  to	  achieve	  
it	  across	  borders.	  Option	  2	  goes	   further	  to	  establish	  a	  cross-­‐border	  authority	  unlike	  others	  
trialed	  in	  Australia	  to	  date.	  In	  the	  Midlands,	  the	  notion	  of	  multifunctional	  landscapes	  situates	  
biodiversity	  in	  a	  broader	  landscape	  matrix	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  context.	  	  
By	   building	   competence	   to	   govern	   adaptively,	   and	   by	   addressing	   institutional	  
arrangements	  that	  constrain	  effective	  biodiversity	  governance,	  the	  reforms	  aim	  to	  improve	  
biodiversity	   outcomes.	   These	   reforms	   build	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   achieving	   fit	   between	  
institutions	  and	  ecosystems,	  which	   is	   thought	  to	   improve	  ecological	  outcomes	  (Lebel	  et	  al.	  
2013;	  Galaz	  et	  al.	  2008),	  and	  use	  case	  study	   literature	  to	   identify	  areas	  where	   institutional	  
change	  has	  led	  to	  improvements	  in	  outcomes.	  Although	  these	  methods	  are	  widely	  used,	  the	  
causal	   link	  between	   institutions	  and	  ecological	  outcomes	  remains	  one	  of	   the	  most	  difficult	  
challenges	   in	   environmental	   governance	   (Young	   2013).	   One	   promising	   way	   to	   examine	  
whether	   governance	   reforms	   can	   influence	   key	   drivers	   of	   biodiversity	   decline	   is	   through	  
scenario	  planning	  (Mitchell	  et	  al	  2014;	  2015).	  Review	  mechanisms	  have	  also	  been	  built	  into	  
these	   options	   to	   provide	   insight	   into	   how	   biodiversity	   outcomes	   are	   changing	   under	  
reformed	  arrangements.	  
In	  researching	  approaches	  to	  buffering,	  the	  organizational	  change	  literature	  provided	  
guidance	   on	   how	   organizations	   can	   respond	   to	   their	   institutional	   environment	   to	   ensure	  
continuity	  and	  achievement	  of	  organizational	  missions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  external	  influences.	  This	  
includes	  building	  networks,	  structural	  changes,	  fostering	  leaders	  that	  shape	  the	  institutional	  
environment,	  and	  even	  using	  elements	  of	   that	  environment	  to	   legitimize	  action	  within	  the	  
existing	  context	   (Powell	  and	  DiMaggio	  1991;	  O'Toole	  and	  Meier	  2011).	  Such	  strategies	  can	  
help	  organizations	  cope	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  institutional	  environment	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  
change	  (e.g.	  political	  pressure).	  While	  institutional	  entrepreneurs	  can	  be	  a	  source	  of	  change	  
in	  this	  regard,	  this	  literature	  often	  focuses	  on	  what	  made	  these	  actors	  successful	  (Pacheco	  et	  
al.	   2010),	   rather	   than	   on	   how	   they	   have	   guided/could	   guide	   reform	   design.	   Our	   reforms	  
build	  on	  the	  success	  of	  institutional	  entrepreneurs,	  who	  had	  already	  helped	  provide	  some	  of	  
the	  key	  elements	  of	  change,	  such	  as	  re-­‐framing	   issues	  and	   legitimizing	  the	  merits	  of	  cross-­‐
border	  collaboration.	  Further	  research	  into	  how	  to	  buffer	  against	  external	  influences	  at	  both	  
the	  scale	  of	  organizations	  and	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  governance	  regimes,	  and	  how	  to	  better	  utilize	  
entrepreneurial	   efforts	   in	   institutional	   design	   would	   provide	   much	   needed	   insights	   for	  
efforts	  elsewhere.	  
Reform	  was	  also	  required	  to	  pursue	  the	  core	  principles	  of	  good	  governance	  (Lockwood	  
2010).	  Adopting	  broader	  notions	  of	  accountability	  was	  a	  particularly	  challenging	  dimension	  
to	   address	   in	   the	   reforms	   because,	  while	   there	   is	  widespread	   agreement	   in	   the	   literature	  
that	   the	   problem	  exists,	   there	   are	   few	   case	   study	   examples	  where	   accountability	   reforms	  
were	   successful.	   The	   concept	   of	   accountable	   autonomy	   (Fung	   2004)	   provided	   some	  
guidance,	  with	   research	   testing	   such	   reforms	   in	  a	  biodiversity	   governance	   situation	  a	  high	  
priority.	   The	   reforms	   also	   sought	   to	   address	   fairness,	   legitimacy,	   and	   inclusiveness	  
dimensions	  by	  broadening	  the	  scope	  of	  current	  conservation	  in	  the	  Midlands,	  expanding	  the	  
actors	  actively	  engaged	  in	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  developing	  options	  that	  would	  need	  public	  
review	  or,	  –	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  statutory	  authority	  in	  the	  Alps	  and	  the	  charter	  in	  the	  Midlands	  
–	  legislative	  approval	  and/or	  parliamentary	  oversight.	  	  
While	  the	  pragmatic	  approach	  described	  here	  offers	  practical	  guidance	  for	  designing	  
adaptive	  biodiversity	  institutions,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  important	  caveats.	  Regarding	  the	  methods,	  
although	  the	  three	  stages	  provide	  a	  useful	  guide	  to	  operationalizing	  the	  process	  of	  reform	  
development,	  in	  practice	  there	  was	  greater	  overlap	  between	  stages	  2	  and	  3	  than	  depicted	  in	  
Figure	  1.	  This	  is	  because	  reform	  development	  moved	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  diagnostic	  
results	   and	   other	   context-­‐specific	   considerations,	   the	   literature,	   and	   focus	   group	   data.	  
Regarding	   the	   reform	  mapping,	   the	   templates	  were	   inspired	   by	   depictions	   of	   governance	  
models	  elsewhere,	  but	  they	  are	  a	  heuristic	  to	  spark	  discussion	  and	  debate,	  and	  not	  the	  only	  
way	  to	  depict	  reform	  possibilities.	  Even	  within	  the	  plausible	  reform	  space,	  the	  options	  were	  
constrained	  by	  what	  was	  in	  the	  literature,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  known	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  is	  
‘probable’	   rather	   than	  what	   is	   ‘possible’	   when	   developing	   reform	   options	   (Rickards	   et	   al.	  
2014).	   Researchers	   using	   this	   approach	   elsewhere	   could	   explore	   ways	   to	   stretch	   thinking	  
about	  reform	  options.	  	  	  
There	   are	   also	   many	   complexities	   to	   mapping	   and	   designing	   these	   reform	  
possibilities	  that	  could	  not	  be	  outlined	  in	  detail	  here,	  with	  such	  considerations	  as	  the	  relative	  
power	  of	  stakeholders,	  potential	  perverse	  consequences,	  and	  likely	  constraints	  all	  meriting	  
attention.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  process	  outlined	  here	  was	  experimental.	  
While	  both	  the	   level	  of	  power	  and	  authority	  varied	  across	  participants,	   this	  process	  would	  
need	   to	   be	   more	   inclusive	   if	   being	   applied	   in	   a	   non-­‐experimental	   context.	   In	   particular,	  
reform	  in	  private	  landscapes	  would	  require	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  engage	  a	  greater	  number	  
of	   landholders,	   and	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   stakeholders	   with	   interests	   in	   protected	   areas.	  
Although	   participants	   in	   this	   study	   included	   both	   individuals	   and	   organizations	   who	   are	  
already	  involved	  and	  those	  who	  are	  not,	  the	  quantum	  of	  participants	  would	  need	  to	  expand	  
to	   ensure	   representativeness.	   Researchers	   and	   practitioners	   elsewhere	   could	   follow	   the	  
same	  processes,	  but	  choose	  to	  engage	  a	  broader	  cross-­‐section	  of	  actors	  and	  conduct	  a	  more	  
detailed	   analysis	   of	   specific	   aspects	   of	   reformed	   arrangements,	   like	   power,	   equity,	   and	  
legitimacy.	  
	  There	  are	  also	  limits	  to	  intentional	  institutional	  design.	  The	  options	  steer	  toward	  two	  
governance	  designs,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  end	  result	  would	  almost	  inevitably	  
diverge	  from	  that	  envisioned	  here.	  Bricolage	  is	  a	  dynamic	  that	  creates	  small	  changes	  all	  the	  
time,	   and	   diffusion	   and	   translation	   can	   lead	   to	   more	   radical	   changes	   without	   deliberate	  
design	   efforts	   (Cleaver	   2012;	   Campbell	   2010).	   The	   dynamics	   are	   likely	   to	   mirror	   those	  
described	  by	  Djelic	  and	  Quack	  (2007),	  where	  even	  institutional	  transformation	  comes	  about	  
through	   a	   long	   process	   of	   incremental	   steps	   and	   a	   series	   of	   interlinked,	   dynamic,	   and	  
crooked	   pathways.	   The	   stance	   taken	   here	   is	   thus	  more	   aligned	  with	   the	   concept	   of	   path	  
generation,	  where	  legacies	  and	  path	  dependencies	  are	  important,	  but	  not	  destiny	  (Djelic	  and	  
Quack	  2007).	   Interplay	  between	  the	  case	  study	  regions	  and	  state	  and	  national	  policies	  add	  
layers	  of	  complexity,	  but	  also	  present	  opportunities	  to	  generate	  new	  paths	  at	  multiple	  levels.	  
The	   reforms	   for	   both	   case	   studies	   not	   only	   seek	   to	   influence	   these	   other	   levels,	   but	  may	  
ultimately	  spur	  new	  approaches	  elsewhere.	  	  
The	   end	   result	   is	   also	   difficult	   to	   control,	   given	   the	   options	   focus	   on	   enabling	   self-­‐
organizing,	   manager	   discretion,	   and	   more	   community-­‐based	   approaches	   to	   biodiversity	  
governance.	  A	  pragmatist	  approach	  to	  institutional	  change	  requires	  giving	  up	  on	  the	  ‘quest	  
for	   certainty’	   evident	   in	   both	   traditional	   and	   New	   Public	   Management	   literatures	   (Ansell	  
2011).	   This	   is	   echoed	   in	   the	   institutional	   change	   literature.	   While	   innovations	   can	   be	  
introduced	   from	  the	  outside,	  design	  cannot	  dictate	  exactly	  how	   institutional	  elements	  will	  
be	   combined	   in	   practice	   (Campbell	   2010).	   Similarly,	   institutional	   designers	   can	   support	  
reform	   and	   create	   conditions	   enabling	   landscape-­‐scale	   collaboration	   and	   a	   focus	   on	  
outcomes,	  but	  the	  ultimate	  outcomes	  themselves	  cannot	  be	  crafted,	  particularly	  in	  complex	  
social-­‐ecological	   systems.	   Within	   these	   limits,	   the	   approach	   to	   design	   employed	   in	   this	  
research	  offers	  a	  systematic	  and	  realistic	  way	  to	  generate	  new	  reform	  pathways	  and	  achieve	  
institutional	   change.	   Our	   approach	   achieves	   this	   by	   using	   current	   competencies	   and	  
institutional	  legacy	  as	  scaffolding,	  while	  aiming	  to	  build	  competence	  to	  govern	  adaptively.	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